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1 Introduction
This paper studies infrastructure development in the context of a growth model where
trade occurs across a continuum of space (after Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014) and
where the costs of trading across that space are a function of the endogenous supply of in-
frastructure at each location. By explicitly modelling the geography and the endogenous
determination of trade costs, we can capture the bi-directional interaction between the
evolution of trade costs and the location, concentration and growth of firms in diﬀerent
sectors. Such interaction can happen via two channels. First, the growth of employment
in transport and distribution services can be a response to the growth of, and the spatial
concentration in, the agricultural and industrial sectors. Second, the demand for new in-
frastructure investment can emerge in diﬀerent locations as some regions become wealthy
or as industrial hotspots emerge far from large markets for first-geography reasons. In
turn, the employment of labour in transport services means less labour is available for
industry and agriculture; this may lower firm scale and delay the onset of investment in
innovation. Further, the lower transport costs that follow infrastructure improvements
stimulate further changes to the economic geography. With the model in hand, we match
quantitative aspects of the macroeconomic and spatial history of England and Wales over
the period of the industrial revolution. We then use counterfactual treatments of the
model to consider the dynamic impact on growth of policies that change the timing and
spatial distribution of infrastructural development.
Investment in transport infrastructure is often central to eﬀorts at stimulating devel-
opment in low-income countries (World Bank, 2015). We know that significant change
in economic geography is a feature of development (Desmet and Henderson, 2015) and
that falling transport costs have an impact on economic activity (Redding and Turner,
2015). We have only a limited understanding, however, of how transport costs, economic
geography and economic growth interact in an economy going through a transition to
high growth. How does the quantity of labour employed in the tertiary sector, the quan-
tity of infrastructure investment, its timing relative to transition to high growth, and its
geographical focus, aﬀect long-run macroeconomic outcomes such as structural transfor-
mation and the emergence of sustained high growth? The answers to these questions
should inform policies directed toward infrastructure.
Modern infrastructure investment, even if financed in partnership with the private
sector, is generally organized and planned by the State. The experience of England and
Wales during the industrial revolution, in contrast, was of infrastructure development that
was largely driven locally by private enterprise. The industrial revolution was accompa-
nied by a revolution in transport infrastructure that occupied an increasing proportion of
the workforce and that vastly reduced the cost and increased the speed of transporting
goods (Bogart, 2014). That transport revolution was a response to, and stimulant of, the
reshaping of the economic geography of England and Wales which occurred during the
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18th and 19th centuries.
We develop a model that captures the evolution of the transport sector in England and
Wales over the period c.1710–1881. To do so, we introduce endogenous transportation
costs to the framework of spatial development in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014). In
particular, we make the cost of transporting goods through a location endogenous to the
supply of infrastructure at that location. Infrastructure supply is part transport labour
and part stock of infrastructure capital. Landowners hire transportation labour to facili-
tate the wholesaling and distribution of goods through their land. Landowners may also
invest in improving the infrastructure capital. As in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014),
firms can invest in developing improved production methods at a location and, as in Trew
(2014), non-homothetic preferences mean that consumption shifts toward manufactured
goods as incomes grow. The evolution of the transport sector occurs simultaneously with
those firm decisions that drive the aggregate takeoﬀ in growth rates and the structural
transformation of the economy.
We initialize the model using data for the occupational structure of England and
Wales at c.1710. We then run the model for 171 periods and track its predictions against
various macroeconomic variables, such as average growth rate and overall structural trans-
formation, as well as against the spatial distribution of employment in each sector, the
endogenous decline in transport costs and the spatial distribution of infrastructure im-
provements. An industrial takeoﬀ in the North of England, and the specialization of the
South in agriculture, means that a greater quantity of output is traded over greater aver-
age distances. The demand for transportation improvements emerges locally as a response
to the demand for inter-regional trade. Since transport costs also aﬀect the scale of pro-
duction, incentives to innovate and the emergence of agglomerations, there is a feedback
from that infrastructural development to the speed of the takeoﬀ in growth.
By modelling infrastructural development as an endogenous process, and by matching
that model to the historical experience during the industrial revolution, we can ask how
policies which depart from the experience in England and Wales may have aﬀected the
timing and speed of takeoﬀ. We find that the timing of infrastructure improvements mat-
ter more than their spatial distribution. Most interestingly, we find that infrastructural
development that happens too early can actually delay the onset of modern growth. Only
in a model in which geography and endogenous technological change interact with the
costs of transporting good.
1.1 Related Literature
The paper builds on a number of diﬀerent strands in the literature. First, we relate to
the literature on urban economics, development and the impact of trade costs. Desmet
and Henderson (2015) surveys the literature on the relationship between economic devel-
opment and the changing geographical organization of economic activity. As they show,
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one particular avenue for research is in modelling the interplay between macroeconomic
outcomes, such as growth, and the spatial distribution of economic activity. For this
paper, technological progress occurs as firms attain scale in cities; those agglomerations
are themselves a function of a transportation network that evolves as the economy grows.
While there is a recent literature1 that makes endogenous the costs of transportation, or
the transport network itself, these are limited to static models and, mostly, a discrete
number of large spatial units. Here, we study trade across a continuum of space and
adopt the spatial development framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014). A fur-
ther contribution is in understanding the role of transport costs on economic activity.
Redding and Turner (2015) surveys the literature that looks to identify the consequences
of exogenous variations in infrastructure supply on the spatial distribution of economic
activity. These include structural approaches such as Donaldson (2015) and Allen and
Arkolakis (2014). Those papers incorporate the general equilibrium eﬀect of improving
market access in one location on activity in other locations. Such models tend, again,
to be static and typically only model one sector (agriculture). In a recent breakthrough,
Nagy (2015) models spatial development over time in two sectors and obtains results on
the impact of infrastructure on growth. Here we model structural transformation and
evolution of infrastructure as it occurs over one-dimensional space and time.
Second, the paper relates to the literature on growth, structural transformation and
transport costs. As shown in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), one way to generate
endogenous growth is to model firms that innovate based on it being tied the use of land
as an excludable factor of production. This paper uses that framework and extends Trew
(2014) to incorporate labour employed in the transport sector. It thus contributes to
the literature on structural transformation (see Herrendorf et al., 2014). A number of
papers, such as Adamopoulos (2011), Herrendorf et al. (2012) and Gollin and Rogerson
(2014), show how exogenous transport costs aﬀect labour allocations in a static setup
with exogenous growth. For this paper, transport costs and growth evolve endogenously
over time.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the industrial revolution. Shaw-Taylor and
Wrigley (2014) have recently shown that the truly dynamic part of the economy over the
course of the nineteenth century, the period in which per capita growth took oﬀ (Crafts
and Harley, 1992), was the tertiary sector. A large portion of that tertiary sector growth
constituted a transport revolution that was projected by largely private enterprise which
faced a need to reduce the costs of inter-regional trade (Bogart, 2014). Szostak (1991) is
among those that have made a case for the importance of transportation Britain’s early
industrial lead over France. Recent work by Desmet et al. (2015) investigates how lower
transport costs increased spatial competition, reduced the power of guilds and led to
industrialization. This paper contributes to that debate by simultaneously modelling the
1See, for example, Kleinert and Spies (2011), Asturias and Petty (2013) and Swisher (2015).
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role of transportation services and growth. By conducting counterfactual exercises, we
can ask whether industrial takeoﬀ may indeed have been delayed as a result of diﬀerent
transport policies.
1.2 Outline
In section 2 we briefly discuss England and Wales during the industrial revolution as well
as evidence on the nature of the transport revolution during that time. We develop the
full model of endogenous infrastructure in two steps. First, in section 3 we make labour
in transport and distribution endogenous to output and trade across space but keep the
infrastructure stock fixed. In section 4 we present simulation results which demonstrate
that this model can match the aggregate and spatial development of England and Wales
over the period c.1710–1881. Second, in section 5 we extend the model to allow endogenous
investments in infrastructure stock, comparing the model to the data for England and
Wales in section 6. Section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Occupational change, growth and transportation
in England and Wales, c.1710–1881
We focus on the industrial revolution in England and Wales for two main reasons. First,
infrastructure development in England and Wales during the 18th and 19th centuries
was relatively decentralized (see Trew, 2010). Today, infrastructure projects are care-
fully planned by central governments (even where financed privately). For eighteenth and
nineteenth century England and Wales, infrastructure development was characterized by
local projection (i.e., not organized into a national system) and local finance. While the
contrast to modern policies is clear, we can, as discussed below, draw a more direct his-
torical contrast in the policies toward infrastructure between Britain and France. Second,
we have exceptionally detailed data at high spatial resolution for England and Wales over
the period when it was the first nation to enter a sustained period of high growth and
the scene of the most rapid revolution in the speed and cost of transportation to that
date. This data permits an understanding of the changing economic geography and spa-
tial takeoﬀ that underpinned the industrial revolution. We can thus ask whether and how
the development of infrastructure interacted with the spatial takeoﬀ.
2.1 Occupational structure and growth
For occupational information we use the data described in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) at
three dates: c.1710, c.1817 and 1881. The data is observed at the level of 624 registrations
districts covering nearly all of England and Wales. For 1881, the available census records
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provide a complete picture of the local occupational structure. For c.1817, there was
no such occupational census. Shaw-Taylor et al. describe the process of constructing a
‘quasi-census’ based on information in parish baptismal records. The data for c.1710 uses
the observations of baptismal records in 1,062 of the 11,102 ancient parishes in England
at that time. Trew (2014) uses this sample to construct predicted values for the number
of adult males in each major occupation (primary, secondary, tertiary and textiles) at the
level of the registration district.
Occupations are categorised using the Wrigley (2010) Primary-Secondary-Tertiary
(PST) system. Primary occupations are mainly agriculture but also fisheries and mining
(the latter of which we remove).2 Secondary occupations are manufacturing, processing
and construction. The tertiary sector is composed of four groups: Transportation and
communication; sellers; dealers; and professionals. The distributive sector (i.e., the ter-
tiary sector less professions) makes up over half the total tertiary employment through
the period of study. We use the total tertiary sector here because the reconstruction of
c.1710 occupations is less reliable at lower levels of sectoral aggregation.3 Figure 1 depicts
the structural transformation at the PST level, alongside the trend in per capita growth
of output over the same period from Mokyr (2004).
Figure 1: Occupational structure and growth
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Figure 1 captures the surprising aspect of the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) findings
2In the Wrigley classification, the Primary sector includes mining. We remove mining since it behaves
quite diﬀerently from agriculture in terms of the aggregate trend and the spatial sorting behaviour. When
we refer to primary in this paper, we mean primary less mining.
3The trend for tertiary minus professions and services over the 19th century is much like that shown in
Figure 1. The sum of labour in transport, communications and wholesaling makes up a stable proportion
of total tertiary labour, and so a similarly increasing proportion of total population, from 8% in c.1817
to 14% in 1881.
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(see also Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley, 2014). The secondary sector is stable and growing
over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from 41% in c.1710 to 43.5%
in c.1817 and finally 48% in 1881. The decline in the primary sector starting early in
the eighteenth century accelerates after 1817 but this is not reflected by a growth in the
relative importance of industry. Instead, the decline in agriculture is accompanied by
the rapid growth of the tertiary sector. Most strikingly, the accelerated shift of labour
out of the primary sector and the rapid increase in the tertiary sector is coincident with
the takeoﬀ in per capita growth. At a macroeconomic level, this suggests that there is
something missing in the typical understanding of growth as simply a result of a shift of
resources from agriculture to industry alone. One way of understanding this is bound up
in space, as Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) conjecture:
It may be that the majority of tertiary growth in the nineteenth century was
required simply to move the greatly increased output of primary and secondary
goods longer average distances around the country. If this is the case then the
rise of the tertiary sector was caused, at least in part, by the marked expansion
in the productivity of other sectors and in that sense heralds the onset of modern
economic growth.
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b), p.21.
That is, tertiary employment growth can be a function of changes in the size and
spatial concentration of the primary and secondary sectors.
2.2 The spatial transformation
Since we have information at the level of the registration district, we can also consider the
changes in the spatial structural transformation. Figures 2–4 use the Shaw-Taylor et al.
(2010b) data to map the registration district shares of adult male employment in primary
(red), secondary (blue) and tertiary (green) occupations, respectively. The primary sector
becomes more spatially specialized in the South of the country. The spatial distribution of
the secondary sector is relatively stable over the period. The small industrial hotspots are
visible in the North and Midlands; these become slightly larger over the period. As will
be seen below, a significant characteristic of change in the secondary sector results from
movement of population to the industrial regions. Since, in local terms, those regions
at the heart of the industrial revolution were already highly industrialized at c.1710,
Figure 3 masks this important feature of spatial change. The most striking change is that
shown in Figure 4. In particular, there is little clear change to the spatial distribution of
tertiary employment. Most areas outside the London area have less than 15% of workers
employed in the tertiary sector at c.1710. By 1881, no registration district has less than
10% employed. The growth in the importance of the tertiary sector occurs uniformly
across all areas of the country, whether they were initially agricultural or industrial.
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Figure 2: Primary Employment Shares, c.1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b)
Figure 3: Secondary Employment Shares, c.1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b)
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Figure 4: Tertiary Employment Share, c.1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b)
2.3 The transport revolution
The nature of the transport revolution in Britain is discussed in Bagwell (1974) and the
excellent survey in Bogart (2014). For Bagwell (p.15), “It was the rapidly increasing
volume of inter-regional exchange that made imperative the introduction of more sophis-
ticated forms of goods transport.” Those improvements took the form of new technologies
such as better paving and river improvements, as well as better modes of transport. For
the purposes of this paper, we treat the improvements within a mode and across modes
of transport as one continual improvement in transport infrastructure technology.
The principal means of improving inland transportation in the eighteenth century
was the introduction of privately managed roads in the form of turnpike trusts. These
trusts, while not profit-making, were permitted by an Act of Parliament to charge tolls
for passage along the road. As Buchanan (1986) and Bogart (2007) describe, the trusts
were run by those local to the infrastructure; they were often formed in response to local
demand. The second major mode of transport took the form of extending navigable
rivers and the construction of canals, particularly from the early nineteenth century on.
For canals, Parliament authorized the formation of joint-stock companies that could raise
the capital required for investment. Using data on subscriptions to canal company stock,
Ward (1974) shows that, as with turnpikes, the canals were organized and financed by
those local to the infrastructure. By consequence, as Turnbull (1987) finds, those early
canal improvements again served local markets in a way that was not initially connected
to a national system. Into the nineteenth century, the construction of railways became
the means of improvement to inland transportation. Once more, as Hunt (1935) and Shea
9
(2012) document, the railways were often projected for local purposes on the back of local
subscriptions to the railway companies. Broadbridge (1955) tracks the integration of the
railway network and its finance into a national network in the latter half of the nineteenth
century.
This pattern of local projection and local finance of transport improvements reveals
just how endogenous the transport network was to regional economic developments. Since
industrial developments occurred in a small number of hotspots, thus did infrastructure
improve alongside those local developments. The consequent fall in transport costs over
the period was dramatic. Bogart (2014) collates data (see Figure 5) that demonstrates
there was a 95% reduction in real shillings per ton mile from 1700 to 1865 across all forms
of transport (road, waterway, rail). The fall in freight cost between waterways in 1730 to
rail in 1865 is 86%.
Figure 5: Freight costs (Bogart, 2014)
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To put British infrastructural development into an historical contrast, we can compare
it with the situation in France. The Becquet plan of 1822 envisioned a public-private
partnership: A centrally planned waterway system paid for by private capital. A group of
civil engineers, the Corps des Ponts et Chausse´es, was charged with setting and enforcing
the regulations for a waterway network of suﬃcient quality. As Le´vy-Leboyer (1978)
notes, the centralized nature of infrastructural development in France extended beyond
canals and covered also railways. At their introduction, there was also uncertainty over
the role of railways in the context of the canal plan (Smith, 1990). Even once Napoleon
III began to promote the private finance of a dominant railway infrastructure, private
plans were still subject to the layout, location and specifications dictated by the Corps.
Milward and Saul (1973, p. 336) argue that government “beset railway building with so
many safeguards as to delay its flourishing by a full decade.”
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3 Model with fixed infrastructure capital
We briefly outline the structure of the model before developing it in detail. Trew (2014)
introduces non-homethetic preferences into the spatial development framework of Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg (2014, henceforth DR-H). In this set-up, we have two final goods:
Agricultural and manufacturing. As income grows, the marginal utility from consuming
agricultural (manufacturing) goods declines (increases) and so consumption (and labour
demand by firms) shifts towards manufactured goods. Firms, arranged along an interval
of space, hire labour and rent land; they can also invest in a chance to improve their
production technology. Perfectly mobile workers can move in advance of productivity
realisation to the location that yields the greatest expected utility. Subsequent to inno-
vation and production, there is spatial diﬀusion of productivity before the start of next
period.
Since workers consume at the location of their employment, each point in space may
export one type of final good and import another. Such trade is costly and, in DR-H
and Trew (2014), this cost is assumed to be a fixed iceberg cost. This present study is
of the development of transport infrastructure so we make additional departures from
Trew (2014) as motivated by two facts. First, at an aggregate level, a substantial portion
of labour is employed in the tertiary sector (that is, transport, distribution, wholesal-
ing and professions). Second, significant resources are expended on improving the stock
of infrastructure at a location by, for example, improving roads or constructing canals.
Transport costs at a location are determined by both the labour employed in transport
and wholesaling and by the stock of transport infrastructure at a location. Moreover,
both the labour employed and the stock of infrastructure varies significantly across space
and changes over time.
In this section, we make transport costs endogenous to the infrastructure supply at
each location. Infrastructure supply is part stock of infrastructure, which we initially take
to be exogenous, and part labour supplied to facilitate the transport of goods through a
location. Conditions on the equilibrium relationship between infrastructure stock, labour
and transport costs for equilibrium are identified. In particular, while equilibrium trade
determines the demand for labour in transport, that labour in transport is also drawing
labour away from the production of final goods. As such, we need to ensure that an
equilibrium in the goods and labour markets exists. We consider the quantitative perfor-
mance of the model against the data in section 4. In section 5, we make the supply of
infrastructure over connected intervals endogenous to investments by individual firms in
those intervals.
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3.1 Preferences
Agents earn a wage w(ℓ, t) from supplying labour to firms which are ordered at points ℓ
on the closed interval of land [0, 1], as in DR-H. Agents also hold a diversified portfolio
of all land and so receive an equal share of all rental income, R˜(t)/L¯ where R˜(t) is the
aggregate net land rent and L¯(t) is the fixed total labour supply. There is no storage
good. A consumer solves the following optimization problem,
max
{cA(ℓ,t),cM (ℓ,t)}∞0
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU (cA(ℓ, t), cM(ℓ, t)) (1)
s.t. w(ℓ, t) +
R˜(t)
L¯
= pA(ℓ, t)cA(ℓ, t) + pM(ℓ, t)cM(ℓ, t), ∀(ℓ, t),
where cA(ℓ, t) and cM(ℓ, t) is consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods, re-
spectively, pA(ℓ, t) and pA(ℓ, t) are prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods, respec-
tively, and U(·) is the instantaneous utility function that takes the following Stone-Geary
form, as in Trew (2014),
U(cA(ℓ, t), cM(ℓ, t)) = (cA(ℓ, t)− γ)
η(cM(ℓ, t))
1−η (2)
where η ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0 captures a subsistence requirement in agriculture. Given free
mobility of labour, equilibrium prices, wages and rental income equalize utility across all
locations at a given point in time.
3.2 Firms and innovation
A firm at location ℓ can produce either agricultural or manufacturing goods using labour
Li(ℓ, t) and land (which is normalized to one),
A(ℓ, t) = ZA(ℓ, t)LA(ℓ, t)
α, (3)
M(ℓ, t) = ZM(ℓ, t)LM(ℓ, t)
µ, (4)
where α < µ captures agricultural production that is more land intensive and where
ZA(ℓ, t) and ZM(ℓ, t) are the location-dependent productivity levels in each sector.
Prior to hiring labour and making a bid for land, firms may expend resources on
obtaining a draw for better technology at their location. In particular, a firm buys a
probability φ of innovating at sector-dependent cost ψi(φ). If a firm is successful in
innovating, it draws a zˆ from a Pareto distribution with minimum value 1 and Pareto
parameter ai.4 Successful innovation yields a production technology of zˆZi(ℓ, t). We let
4We assume that innovation draws are spatially correlated – firms arbitrarily close receive the same
innovation otherwise an infinite number of draws combined with continuous diﬀusion would lead to infinite
productivity.
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the expected draw be greater in manufacturing than in agriculture (i.e., aA > aM). The
expected technology for a firm that spends resources on a chance at innovation is thus,
E (Zi(ℓ, t)|Zi) =
(
φ
ai − 1
+ 1
)
Zi. (5)
Firms that attempt to innovate may oﬀer a greater rent to landowners if the expected
gains from innovating outweigh the costs. However, at the end of each period (after
production and consumption), technology in each sector is spatially diﬀused with decay
δ, that is,
Zi(ℓ, t) = max
r∈[0,1]
e−δ|ℓ−r|Zi(r, t− 1). (6)
Since labour is perfectly mobile, and since technology diﬀuses at the end of each
period, DR-H show that despite the persistence of the new technologies that emerge
from innovation, the advantage to innovators dissipates leaving the firm problem as a
maximization of current-period profits. That is, a firm chooses φi to solve,
max
φi
pi(ℓ, t)
(
φ
ai − 1
+ 1
)
ZiLˆi(ℓ, t)
ı − w(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)− Rˆi(ℓ, t)− ψ(φ(ℓ, t)), (7)
There are fixed and marginal costs to obtaining a chance of innovation. As in Trew
(2014), we let these costs vary by sector and, in particular, we account for the feature
of industrial growth that manufacturing technologies were more energy-intensive than
agricultural ones. The cost of drawing a probability of innovation φ in sector i is,
ψi(φ) = ψ1,i + Γiξ(ℓ) + ψ2,i
(
1
1− φ
)
if φ > 0, (8)
where ξ(ℓ) is the energy cost at location ℓ, ψ1,i > 0 is the fixed cost parameter, ψ2,i > 0
is the marginal cost parameter and Γi = 1 if i =M and 0 otherwise.5 Conditional on the
expected net gain being positive, firms choose the φ that maximize the expected increase
in net profits, that is, the optimal investment probability is,
φ∗i (ℓ, t) = 1−
(
ψ2,i(ai − 1)
pi(ℓ, t)Zi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)ı
)1/2
. (9)
As can be seen from equation (9), there is a scale eﬀect present in the intensity of in-
novation: Higher output at a location is accompanied by a higher optimal innovation
probability.
5As in DR-H, in simulations we make ψ(·) proportional to wages to ensure that the cost of innovation
keeps pace with the growing economy.
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3.3 Transport costs and tertiary labor
The landowner rents out land as an input to production but it is also costly to transport
goods across that land. In DR-H, the transport cost is assumed to be a fixed iceberg
cost and labor is used only in the production of manufacturing and agricultural outputs.
In this paper, we model transport costs as a function of both the labour allocated to
transport at a location and the stock of infrastructure at that location (assumed fixed
until section 5).
In particular, the iceberg cost of transporting a good through a location ℓ at time t is
κ(ℓ, t). As such, prices for a good i being shipped from location s to location r satisfies,
pi(r, t) = exp
{∫ r
s
κ(ℓ, t)dℓ
}
pi(s, t). (10)
That is, the price of good shipped from location s to location r takes account of the
accumulated melt of the shipped good,
∫ r
s κ(ℓ, t)dℓ. In DR-H, κ(ℓ, t) = κ, so equation
(10) reduces to pi(r, t) = eκ|r−s|pi(s, t).
We assume that the transport cost depends on tertiary labour at a location, LT (ℓ, t),
and the transport stock at a location, T (ℓ, t), in the following simple way. The cost of
trade through a location ℓ at time t is,
κ(ℓ, t) =∞ if LT (ℓ, t) < LˆT (ℓ, t), (11)
κ(ℓ, t) = κe−T (ℓ,t) if LT (ℓ, t) ≥ LˆT (ℓ, t). (12)
where κ > 0 is the baseline transport cost at all locations and T (ℓ, t) is the stock of
transport infrastructure at location and date (ℓ, t). The transport cost is infinite if tertiary
labour is less than a minimum amount LˆT (ℓ, t). That minimum is increasing in the amount
of output produced at a location (which requires wholesaling and distribution) and the
amount traded through the location (which requires transportation). In particular,
LˆT (ℓ, t) = f [E [Y (ℓ, t)] , E [|H(ℓ, t)|]] (13)
where Y (ℓ, t) is output at and |H(ℓ, t)| is trade through location ℓ in time t. We assume
fY > 0 and f|H| > 0. Labour for production is hired in advance of productivity realisa-
tions; and the tertiary labour LˆT is based on the expected output and trade. After that
minimum tertiary labour, the transport cost is determined by the stock of infrastructure
capital.
We turn to the endogenous determination of T (ℓ, t) in Section 5 where an investment
in infrastructure at a location ℓ increases T (ℓ, t), reducing κ(ℓ, t). For now, we focus on
endogenous tertiary labour and let the transport stock be exogenously fixed at T (ℓ, t) = 0
for all (ℓ, t), i.e., κ(ℓ, t) = κ.
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There are two issues that endogenous tertiary labour presents. First, equation (13)
captures a form of congestion since higher expected output (or trade) generates a greater
local tertiary labour demand. That higher transport demand pulls labour away from
agriculture/manufacturing and increases local consumption of the final goods. As such,
it must be that an increase in output at a location is not fully absorbed by higher local
consumption by the extra tertiary labour. The same is true of an increase in trade that
results from higher output. Second, while tertiary labour is determined by economic ac-
tivity it also determines economic activity via its aﬀect on the labour supply remaining for
production of the final good. For labour markets to clear, we need the sum of agricultural,
manufacturing labour and tertiary labour to equal the total labour supply.
3.4 Equilibrium in land, labour and goods
Landowners rent land to the firm that oﬀers the highest rental payment net of the cost
of tertiary labour,
R˜(ℓ, t) = max
{
R˜A(ℓ, t), R˜M(ℓ, t)
}
. (14)
where, for i ∈ {A,M},
R˜i(ℓ, t) = Rˆi(ℓ, t)− LˆT (ℓ, t)w(ℓ, t) (15)
and where landowners hire the minimum amount of labour required for transport through
the location, LˆT (ℓ, t) as defined by equation (13). Rˆi(ℓ, t) is the maximum land bid that
a firm in sector i can make at location ℓ, conditional on optimal labour and innovation
decisions. Landowners allocate land on the basis of both how much rent can be paid but
also how much it will cost to provide the tertiary labour through that location.
We let θi(ℓ, t) = 1 if firm i ∈ {A,M} is producing at (ℓ, t). Following Rossi-Hansberg
(2005), Hi(ℓ, t) is the stock of excess supply of good i between locations 0 and ℓ. This
Hi(ℓ, t) is defined by Hi(0, t) = 0 and the following partial diﬀerential equation,
∂Hi(ℓ, t)
∂ℓ
= θixi(ℓ, t)− ci(ℓ, t)
(∑
i
θi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t) + LˆT (ℓ, t)
)
− κ(ℓ, t)|Hi(ℓ, t)| (16)
As noted above, greater output at a location will induce a greater demand for tertiary
labour at that location. That extra tertiary labour will, in turn, increase the local con-
sumption of final goods. If the induced tertiary labour consumes more than is produced,
then increased production would lead to decreased net exports. We thus impose that the
aﬀect of output on tertiary labour is bounded:
Assumption 1 There is a ν <∞ such that f ′Y < ν for all Y ∈ R
+.
The assumption is required so that an increase in output at a location ℓ does not cause
LˆT (ℓ, t) to increase by so much as to entirely oﬀset that increase in output. While greater
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trade through a location also increases local consumption of each good, it reduces the
amount of trade that flows to the next location in the same way as the transport cost
does, i.e., a congestion eﬀect in transportation.
Finally, equilibrium in the labour market requires,
∫ 1
0
LˆT (ℓ, t) +
∑
i
θi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)dℓ = L¯ (17)
Let L˜(t), denote the total labour that goes to production of agricultural and manufactur-
ing goods at time t, i.e., L˜(t) = L¯− LˆT (t) where LˆT (t) =
∫ 1
0 LˆT (ℓ, t)dℓ.
Lemma 1 There is a LˆT such that: i) The labour in production L˜ generates equilibrium
outputs and trade flows associated with that LˆT via equation (13); and, ii) market clearing
equation (17) holds.
Proof. Let ϕ(L˜) be the total tertiary labour implied by a total productive labour supply
of L˜ = LA+LM , that is, ϕ(L˜) =
{∫ 1
0 LˆT (ℓ, t)dℓ
∣∣L˜} using equation (13). Clearly, ϕ(0) = 0.
A higher L˜ weakly increases Y (ℓ, t) and |H(ℓ, t)| for all ℓ ∈ [0, 1] and so ϕ′ > 0. Total
labour demand is Γ(L˜) = ϕ(L˜) + L˜ which is thus increasing in L˜. Total labour supply is
fixed at L¯ and so labour market clearing requires Γ(L˜) = L¯. Since Γ(0) = 0 and Γ′ > 0,
there is a L˜∗ > 0 at which Γ(L˜∗) = L¯.
Having established that an equilibrium can exist in which tertiary labour is endoge-
nous to output and trade across space, we proceed to simulate the model to consider its
performance in matching the industrial revolution.
4 Quantitative analysis
The model presented in section 3 can be simulated and compared to quantitative evidence.
We do so using occupational information for England and Wales over the period c.1710–
1881. A particular advantage of using data for England and Wales is that, as described
below, we can map 2-dimensional data into a North-South interval that captures many
of the distinct spatial features of the country. We use the initial distribution of labour in
agriculture and manufacturing to initialize the spatial distribution of productivity levels
and, having parameterized other parts of the model using available evidence, we run
the simulation for 171 periods and compare its predictions against the evidence. Before
turning to the endogenous infrastructure stock, we can consider the extent to which the
model with endogenous tertiary labour matches the aggregate and spatial features of
structural transformation, as well as macroeconomic variables such as per capita growth,
average relative prices and average land rents.
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4.1 Application to England and Wales
In order to initialize the model, and to compare its output to the evidence, we need to map
the 2-dimensional occupational and infrastructural information into the 1-dimensional
interval of the model. A benefit of using England and Wales for this purpose is that it is
of a roughly North-South orientation. As in Trew (2014), we can sum occupations along
the East-West axis at each point along the North-South axis. The North-South orientation
is then the interval we use to connect with the model (see Figure 6). In simulations, we
work with 500 discrete and equally-sized ‘parishes’ that make up the whole, so the interval
in the figures are mapped into this [0, 500] interval for comparison to simulation output.
Figure 6: England and Wales Interval
Despite this simplification of the data, many parts of the occupational geography are
recognizable in the interval representation. Figure 7 depicts the total employment data
mapped into the interval at the three dates. Evident in the figure around location ℓ = 125
is the city of London. Also visible is the growth in the labour employed in the North of
England around ℓ = 300 and the relative decline in dominance of London. The interval
permits an understanding of both the geographical distance from London to the hotspot
in the North and of the magnitude of the shift of employment from the South to the
North. One way to look at the occupational structure using the interval representation is
to consider the occupational structure at each location. Figure 8 shows this at three dates.
While the secondary sector remains relatively stable over the period, the primary sector
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becomes increasing spatially concentrated. This is a result of the growth of the tertiary
sector that occurs most rapidly after 1817 and, strikingly, occurs all over the country.
This points to the particular role of the tertiary sector in transport and distribution of
the increased output of the primary and secondary sectors; it grows in importance both
within and between cities. It also shows that the features seen in the 2-dimensional maps
(Figures 2–4) are replicated in the 1-dimensional interval representation.
Figure 7: Interval distribution of total employed (normalized)
4.2 Parameterization
To parameterize the initial spatial distribution of productivity in primary and secondary
sectors, we use the c.1710 spatial distribution of employment in each sector. In particular,
we invert the production functions, equations (3)-(4), to obtain an expression for local
productivity as a function of labour, prices and wages at each location. We then use
observations for labour employed along with prices and wages which solve the model (see
Trew, 2014, for more detail). For the endogenous tertiary labour, we specify equation
(13) with the following aggregator,
LˆT (ℓ, t) = (cY Y (ℓ, t)
r + cH |H(ℓ, t)|
r)1/r (18)
The baseline parameterization for is given in Table 1. We select cY and cH to fit
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Figure 8: Sector Proportions (bottom to top: primary, secondary, tertiary)
the initial aggregate level and spatial distribution of tertiary labour in the model to that
observed in the data. We set r < 1 to simulate a congestion between the diﬀerent drivers
of tertiary labour; an increase in the labour used for trade will raise the marginal increase
in labour needed for wholesaling.
The preference parameters η and γ are chosen to match the initial share of labour in
agriculture and manufacturing as well as the extent of the shift out of agriculture over the
period. We use Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) to pin-down the production parameters
α and µ; as described above, µ > α since agricultural production is relatively more land-
intensive. The Pareto parameters, aM and aA, are chosen to match the historical record
on growth rates. As Allen (2004) documents, there was a long, slow growth agricultural
productivity in the period leading up to the industrial revolution; aA captures a near-
doubling of productivity every 150 years. The manufacturing innovation parameter, aM ,
generates a long-run manufacturing growth rate of 2% as in Crafts and Harley (1992).
The fixed and marginal costs for innovation are chosen to, first, begin at t = 1 with some
agricultural innovation and, second, to pin down the timing of the takeoﬀ of manufacturing
innovation in the baseline simulation. The diﬀusion decay parameter, δ, aﬀects the pace
of takeoﬀ and so we choose is to match the evidence in Crafts and Harley (1992).
The initial transport cost is set at κ = 0.2 (compared with κ = 0.008 in DR-H) to
capture the large costs to transporting goods in the early 18th century. For energy prices,
we use data in Clark and Jacks (2007) and Allen (2009) on the relative price of coal at
diﬀerent locations in 1700.
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Table 1: Parameterisation for baseline models
β 0.95 Standard discount factor.
ZA(ℓ, 0) See text Data in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) and own
working.ZM(ℓ, 0)
κ 0.2 High initial transport cost.
cY 1.1 To match aggregate initial tertiary labour in
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).
cH 0.8
r 0.5
γT 1.02 Estimate of TFP growth from Bogart (2014).
xT 0.56 Construction costs in Pollins (1952) and nominal
GDP in Mitchell (1988).
η 0.275 To match aggregate employment shares over
1710-1860 in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).γ 0.055
α 0.59 Firm-level employment share for agriculture in
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
µ 0.67 Firm-level employment share for manufactured
consumption in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
aM 70 Long-run growth of 2%, Heston et al. (2011).
aA 295 Slow early agricultural growth rate, Allen (2004).
δ 15 To match speed of takeoﬀ in Crafts and Harley
(1992).
ψ1,A 0.5532 A takeoﬀ in agriculture at t = 1.
ψ1,M 0.8000 Timing of manufacturing takeoﬀ as in Crafts and
Harley (1992).ψ2,A,ψ2,M 0.002
ξ(ℓ) See text Coal prices from Allen (2009), Clark and Jacks
(2007).
L¯ 100 Normalised total labor supply.
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4.3 Simulation output
Results from a simulation using the baseline calibration are reported in Figures 9-15.
Figure 9 gives the performance of the model in terms of a number of macroeconomic
variables. The takeoﬀ in growth matches the timing and magnitude of that reported in
Mokyr (2004). The relative price of manufactured goods captures the decline observed in
the data (calculated using the method in Yang and Zhu, 2009). The path of real wages
and average land rent is consistent with the data in Clark (2002).
Figure 9: Baseline Simulation: Macroeconomic Variables
In terms of the aggregate structural transformation, Figure 10 demonstrates the suc-
cess of the model in matching the data described in section 2. Employment in the sec-
ondary sector exhibits a slow, steady increase over the whole period. This is despite that
sector generating the increases in productivity that underpin the takeoﬀ in growth. The
more rapid decline of the primary sector after 1800 is accompanied by an acceleration in
the employment of the tertiary sector. The driver of this change is the increased output
and trade referred to by Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b). Absent the endogenous tertiary
sector, the model would not explain the slow change in the relative importance of the
secondary sector alongside the fast change in the relative importance of the primary.
The benefit of using a model of that incorporates continuous space is that it can
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Figure 10: Baseline Simulation: Structural Transformation
Figure 11: Baseline Simulation: Primary Employment
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Figure 12: Baseline Simulation: Secondary Employment
Figure 13: Baseline Simulation: Textiles Employment (rescaled)
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Figure 14: Baseline Simulation: Tertiary Employment
Figure 15: Baseline Simulation: Tertiary Shares
24
compared against data that oﬀers a high spatial resolution. To that end, Figure 11 plots
the model implications for the distribution of primary employment against the data at
three dates (1710, 1817 and 1881). Productivity growth in the agricultural ‘south’ of the
interval (over the range of roughly ℓ ∈ [84, 174]) occurs endogenously as firms there are
initially larger and can amortize the fixed costs of innovation. This causes primary output
to specialize in the south in a way that mirrors the data and which is consistent with the
literature (Allen, 2004). The localized agricultural innovations cause labour to be more
concentrated than in the data. The eventual decline in the southern primary workforce
in response to the shift toward manufactured goods clearly matches that in the data.
As the agricultural revolution proceeds in the south, consumption demand, and so
labour employed, shifts towards manufacturing firms. That raises the optimal size of
manufacturing firms and makes them more likely to be able to oﬀer land rents in excess
of that oﬀered by agricultural firms. The growing scale of manufacturing firms also
means they may amortize the fixed cost of innovation over a larger output, while because
of the scale-eﬀect in equation (9) the innovation intensity increases. At t = 58 (year
1767), manufacturing firms at locations ℓ = 324 and ℓ = 325 find it optimal to invest in
innovation. Thereafter, the innovation-driven industrial revolution proceeds; aggregate
growth increases and the shift of consumption out of agriculture accelerates. As Figure
12 shows, labour in the secondary sector moves toward a northern hotspot. The location
of this industrial hotspot matches the data, though the size of the takeoﬀ in the model is
in excess of that in the data. As the model is of only one sector, a better comparison is
to the single sector, textiles, that during this period drove industrial growth. As Figure
13 shows, the model captures the location, timing and magnitude (once rescaled) of the
takeoﬀ in textiles employment.
Finally, we can consider the spatial fit of the model to the tertiary employment data.
As Figure 14 shows, the model does well in matching some aspects of the local tertiary
employment, particularly in the initial period and in the industrial hotspot that emerges.
The model does less well in others (such as in London). One of the most salient aspects
of the dynamism of the tertiary sector was shown in Figures 4 and 8, that the growth of
the tertiary sector grew as a proportion of local employment in a highly uniform way. As
Figure 15 shows, the model is able to explain the uniform upward shift in the share of
tertiary employment across the interval. This is quite distinct from the model implications
for the primary and secondary sectors which mirror the data in concentrating in one region.
In being able to match the data with the tertiary sector explained as a function of output
and trade in the other sectors, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis presented
in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).
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4.4 Counterfactual policies
Before moving to the model with endogenous infrastructure investment, we can consider
the impact of policies that might be used to stimulate industrial takeoﬀ via the use of
tertiary labour.
One policy may be a subsidy that lowers the wages paid by firms to transport labour.
Such a policy brings forward the takeoﬀ point (as defined by the first manufacturing
innovation) marginally. A 50% subsidy to wages paid to transport labour means inno-
vation by manufacturing firms begins at t = 46.2, 10 years earlier than in the baseline
as shown in Table 2 (counterfactual 1). With lower transport labour costs, firms have
more resources to hire labor in other sectors, thus making them larger. Firms that are
larger are more likely to be able to overcome the fixed costs to innovation, while the scale
eﬀect in equation (9) shows that larger firms invest more in innovation. Since the wage
is applied to transport labour, it has little impact on the land use by manufacturing and
agriculture firms. The finding in Trew (2014), that subsidies to the use of land by manu-
facturing can delay takeoﬀ because it reduces agglomerations, does not operate strongly
because the policy does not directly aﬀect land use. The takeoﬀ generally happens at
the same location as in the baseline. We can also consider whether the takeoﬀ happens
more quickly by measuring the number of years between takeoﬀ and the time at which
aggregate growth rate passes 1.5%. In the baseline this takes 80.2 years on average; with
a subsidy to transport wages, the takeoﬀ is marginally slower. Where the takeoﬀ starts
earlier, the agricultural revolution is at an earlier stage and so agricultural labour has yet
to be largely released into manufacturing. Nevertheless, the economy with such a wage
subsidy reaches 1.5% growth six years earlier than the baseline.
Table 2: Baseline and Counterfactuals (averages of 10 runs)
t ℓ t to 1.5%
Baseline 56.0 324.5 80.2
1. Subsidy to transport labour 46.2 324.5 83.9
2. Better technology 36.0 310.6 84.8
A second intervention could be to improve the technology used to transport goods.
We run the baseline simulation with a 50% reduction in the transport labour required for
a given amount of output and trade. Given the significantly lower demand for tertiary
labour, the simulation naturally fails to match the aggregate levels of employment in each
sector. However, the consequence of releasing labour into the manufacturing sector means
that those firms are larger and take oﬀ happens at t = 36.0 on average, twenty years earlier
than without the intervention (counterfactual 2 in Table 2). The aﬀect on the timing of
takeoﬀ is greater than with a subsidy to wages since it directly aﬀects the quantity of
labour employed in manufacturing, rather than doing so via lowering the transport wage
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bill. Again, the pace of the takeoﬀ is slower because of the early stage of the agricultural
revolution, but the economy passes the 1.5% growth rate over fifteen years earlier than in
the baseline. In this counterfactual, the location of takeoﬀ does change, shifting closer to
the large initial market in the South. Those areas that previously had a large amount of
tertiary labour because of the trade going through the locations now have larger secondary
firms and a greater likelihood of entering takeoﬀ. This counterfactual also makes clear
the diﬃculty of interpreting the total labour employed in transport as a na¨ıve indicator
of the proximity to takeoﬀ. An economy with low transport labour may be so because it
has little output or trade, but it may also have a better transport technology.
5 Model with endogenous infrastructure
As discussed in section 3.3, transport costs are a function of the stock of transport infras-
tructure at a location, T (ℓ, t). In this section, we introduce a technology that maps local
infrastructure investment into an increase in the local infrastructure stock. So long as
there is suﬃcient transport labour, greater infrastructure stock reduces transport costs at
the location of the investment. However, since individual landowners are of measure zero,
investment from a connected interval of locations is required for an infrastructure invest-
ment to aﬀect transport costs. Further, we assume that an individual landowner cannot
costlessly observe the contributions to the infrastructure investment by landowners in
other locations. As a result, free-riding by landowners means that equilibrium investment
is zero.
Motivated by the discussion in section 2, we introduce a costly reporting technology
(such as the formation of a joint stock company) which provides the means for a group of
landowners to commit to investment in infrastructure. The reporting technology makes in-
vestments in infrastructure public within some distance from the location of the proposed
infrastructure. An intermediary-landowner can propose to use this reporting technology
in the form of a contract that specifies the rent to be paid by firms, the investments
to be made in infrastructure and the net rental payments to each landowner. If every
landowner in the interval weakly prefers to commit to the intermediary’s infrastructure
plan, the intermediary leases land from the landowners and an infrastructure investment
takes place.
There are three problems in addition to the free-riding. First, investments in a per-
sistent stock of infrastructure could potentially make the investment decisions of firms a
dynamic one. Second, an infrastructure improvement over a connected interval may not
monotonically improve the rental income for all landowners in that interval. Third, the
success of an infrastructure investment in one interval may be dependent on the presence
(or absence) of an infrastructure investment over another interval.
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5.1 Intermediation and infrastructure
For tractability, we split the interval of land in the model into a fixed number, N , of
connected intervals that we call ‘counties’. Each county is of equal measure. In particular,
county i ∈ N is the connected interval ∆(i) =
[
i−1
N ,
i
N
]
. The measure of a county i is
m(∆(i)) = 1/N . An infrastructure investment happens at the level of the county and
the reporting technology, when implemented, makes investments in infrastructure public
knowledge within the county.
Each county can invest in infrastructure at fixed cost xT .6 An infrastructure invest-
ment uniformly improves the infrastructure stock in that county. In particular, for date t
in county i, an investment means that T (ℓ, t) = T (ℓ, t−1)+δ(t) for all ℓ ∈ ∆(i). Here δ(t)
is the gain from the fixed investment in infrastructure which grows over time as transport
technologies improve. Bogart (2014) calculates that TFP growth in the transport sector
was around 2% over the period of study. As such, we let δ(t) = (1.02)tδ(0) where δ(0) is
an initial level of transport technology. By equation (12), the increase in the infrastruc-
ture stock reduces transport costs: For a county i that invests in infrastructure at time t,
transport costs are κ(ℓ, t) = e−δ(t)κ(ℓ, t− 1) for ℓ ∈ ∆(i).
The reporting technology works by the intermediary temporarily (for one-period) leas-
ing the land from landowners. An intermediary can propose a contract J that specifies rent
to be paid by firms, RF , investment in infrastructure, xT , and rent to be paid to landown-
ers, RL, i.e., for county i at time t, the contract is a J(i) =
{
RF (ℓ, t), xT , RL(ℓ, t)|ℓ ∈ ∆(i)
}
.
The intermediary collects rental payments from firms, employs tertiary labour and makes
an observable investment in infrastructure.
Since agents own a share of all land, it is the total rent in a county that matters when
landowners decide whether to lease land to the intermediary; we let the total land rent in
county i at time t be denoted RL(i, t) =
∫
ℓ∈∆(i)R
L(ℓ, t)dℓ. Where f is the cost of using
the reporting technology, feasible intermediation in a county i requires,∫
ℓ∈∆(i)
RF (ℓ, t)− LˆT (ℓ, t)w(ℓ, t)dℓ−R
L(i, t)− xT − f ≥ 0. (19)
Intermediation is competitive in the sense that there is free entry to using the reporting
technology. The arrangement that maximises the current period rent to the landowners
wins the contract for improving the infrastructure and leasing the land. As a result, the
net rent paid to landowners in a county i that engages an intermediary is,
R˜L(i, t) =
∫
ℓ∈∆(i)
RF (ℓ, t)− LˆT (ℓ, t)w(ℓ, t)dℓ− x
T − f. (20)
It remains to show that such an intermediary can facilitate investment while retaining
6This means that we abstract from any interdependence in the cost of projecting infrastructure at
diﬀerent locations; see Swisher (2015).
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firm choices that maximize current period profits.
Lemma 2 Firms maximize current period profits in an intermediary contract. There can
exist an intermediary which forms a contract with firms and landowners in a county to
invest in infrastructure.
Proof. Suppose that an intermediary in county i proposes a contract J1(i) which spec-
ifies RL1 (i, t) total rental payment to landowners and R
F
1 (ℓ, t) rents paid by firms. If a
contract J2(i) exists in which higher RF2 (ℓ, t) could be collected by an intermediary then,
by equation (20), R˜L2 (i, t) > R˜
L
1 (i, t). Landowners choose the intermediary contract that
delivers the highest total rent over the county. As a result, competitive intermediation
means that land is allocated to the firms that can pay the highest rent; firms maximise
current period profits.
Let R˜L∗ (i, t) be the maximum net rent that can be oﬀered by an intermediary given
equation (20). Landowners over ℓ ∈ ∆(i) share the county’s rental income. Landowners
that would otherwise receive a lower rent at their location because of the infrastructure
investment can gain from pooling with the higher rent paid elsewhere in the county. Recall
from (14) that R˜(ℓ, t) is the net rent paid to landowners in the absence of intermediation.
If
∫
ℓ∈∆(i) R˜(ℓ, t)dℓ > R˜
L
∗ (i, t) then landowners choose to directly rent land to firms and
there is no infrastructure investment. If
∫
ℓ∈∆(i) R˜(ℓ, t)dℓ ≤ R˜
L
∗ (i, t), an intermediary may
operate and infrastructure investment proceeds.
Finally, investment in one county can be dependent on the presence (or absence) of
investment in another county. Since there can be many Nash equilibria, we select that
which generates the largest total landowner income. Where no such equilibrium exists, we
impose that no investment takes place in any county. Calculating the Nash equilibria can
be computationally intensive since individual county investments must be calculated in all
permutations of other county investments. That is, for an interval split into N counties,
there are up to N ·2N−1 simulations to run. We select N = 10 in the quantitative analysis
below.7
6 Quantitative analysis
We use the model as extended in Section 5 to capture three aspects of the spatial takeoﬀ
of England and Wales during the 18th and 19th centuries in addition to those macroe-
conomic and spatial changes matched in Section 4. Specifically: The overall decline in
transport costs, the timing of the transport revolution, and, the spatial distribution of
the investments in infrastructure.
7While there are optimizations that reduce the number of simulations required, even with N = 10 the
full model with endogenous infrastructure takes between five and six hours on a server with 32 cores.
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6.1 Interval representation of the transport revolution
We first map data on the spatial distribution of the infrastructure revolution into the
one-dimensional interval of the model. We use two sources for the three major modes of
inland transportation (road, waterway and rail). Jackman (1962, Appendix 13) contains
information on road and canal acts per county for the period 1701 to 1830. For railways,
we use Freeman (1986) to map the railway lines in each county in 1840, 1852 and 1872 onto
the ten interval ‘counties’ of the model. In order to combine the three modes into one map
of infrastructure development, we need to weight each mode to form a combined picture
of the spatial infrastructure development. Of course, one turnpike act is not equivalent to
one canal act. First, a canal act would relate to a physically larger piece of infrastructure
than a turnpike act; second, a canal has advantages in transporting heavy loads when
compared to roads, even though their speed was not greatly higher. We can use their
average paid-up capital to gauge the relative size. Bogart (2012) calculates the capital
in turnpikes at 1820 to be £10.4 million (around £9.3k per act, using Jackman’s count
of turnpike trusts at this time). This is in contrast to the estimate of Ward (1974) that
£17 million was paid up in canal capital by 1815 (making around £43k per act, i.e., 4.6
times a turnpike act). In addition to the larger size of a canal project, it would also have
been more directly useful in haulage (see Bagwell, 1974; Turnbull, 1987; Bogart, 2014).
Though measures of the volume of goods traded by road are not available (see Bagwell,
p.58), Bogart (2014) suggests a horse-drawn wagon may carry as much as 7 tons by 1800;
a horse-drawn barge could be loaded with ten times that much. Combining the relative
size of a canal act with its relative capacity for goods transportation, we weight a canal
act as worth 46 turnpike acts. Railways, like canals, can handle heavy loads and, with
the introduction of steam power, do so at much greater speeds than horse-drawn barges.
We can thus weight railways against canals based on their relative speeds. Bogart (2014)
puts the speed of transporting passengers on eighteenth-century stagecoaches at around
one eighth of nineteenth century trains. Our focus is on the transport of output (i.e.,
freight), for which the relative advantage of rail may be smaller. Taylor (1951) presents
evidence for early nineteenth-century U.S. that puts the speed of transporting freight on
roads and canals at around one sixth that on rail (2 vs. 10-12 m.p.h). Our measure of
combined transport development weights a canal act as having 46 times the contribution
of a road act and railways as having six times the contribution of canals.
Figure 16 presents the combined spatial infrastructure data mapped into the 10 coun-
ties used in the model. The significant improvements in the infrastructure stock oc-
curred after 1800 and in a somewhat disjointed fashion, first occurring separately between
ℓ = [100, 150] (that is, around London) and ℓ = [200, 250] (in the Midlands and towards
the North) and then merging into a more connected infrastructure network later into
the nineteenth century. This one-dimensional representation of a patchwork development
mirrors that discussed in the literature (see Section 2).
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Figure 16: Implied transport cost (data, normalized)
6.2 Parameterization
The baseline parameters remain as in Table 1 except for the fixed cost to innovating in
agriculture, since this controls the timing of the takeoﬀ; we set ψ1,A = 0.5452 to target the
takeoﬀ date in the simulations of Section 4. Again, we initialise the model at c.1710 with
a distribution of infrastructure development that is uniformly costly, i.e., T (ℓ, 0) = 0 for
all ℓ. Relative to the improvements that occurred into the 18th century, it is reasonable
to treat transport around England and Wales as being uniformly costly at 1710.
There are two additional parameters to pin-down: The rate of growth of technology
in the transport sector and the fixed costs of investment in physical infrastructures. For
technology growth, we use the estimate in Bogart (2014) of approximately 2% per year.
The fixed costs of constructing transport infrastructure were significant, with large quan-
tities of skilled and unskilled labour required in addition to the materials, purchase of
land, legal fees and fees for agents to navigate the passage of required Acts of Parliament.
Such costs applied just as much to turnpikes as to canals and railways (see Jackman (1962,
p. 236) and Bagwell (1974, p.99). To parameterize the fixed costs of infrastructure im-
provement we use data in Pollins (1952) on nominal construction costs for early railways
with data in Mitchell (1988) for nominal GDP. The average railway construction cost is
0.37% of nominal GDP. Using the baseline calibration, this equates to a per-county fixed
cost of xT = 0.56.
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6.3 Simulation output
The full simulation with endogenous infrastructure results in a takeoﬀ date at t = 57.1
(based on an average of ten runs). The fit against macroeconomic variables, as well as
that against the location and timing of the spatial takeoﬀ, remains close to the data.
While not fully comparable to the previous simulations,8 Figure 17 gives the structural
transformation and growth rates in the data (dashed), in the model with fixed transport
costs (thin) and the model with endogenous transport costs (thick). The left panel shows
that the structural transformation proceeds more quickly in the model with endogenous
infrastructure. The right panel shows that the takeoﬀ in growth occurs somewhat more
slowly when infrastructure endogenously changes over time. This results partly from the
resources allocated to developing infrastructure and partly from the impact on specializa-
tion. Since this comparison is not based on the same parameterization, we come back to
this when we discuss counterfactuals.
Figure 17: Macroeconomic Variables (average of 10 runs)
Data = dashed; Fixed infrastructure = thin; Endogenous infrastructure = thick.
The most interesting component of the simulation output concerns the timing and
intensity of the endogenous infrastructure development. The average decline in transport
costs over the simulation period is 79.7% which is close to that found in the data (86%).
8The parameter ψ1,A is reduced from the simulation without infrastructure development in order to
align the takeoﬀ dates in each simulation.
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Figure 18 depicts the average transport cost in the model as it occurs over space and
time. As can be seen, the model generates infrastructure development that is consistent
with the data in many respects. The acceleration in reduction of transport costs occurs
around 1810 as in the data. The disjointed nature of infrastructure development seen
in the data is replicated in the model, although the model predicts infrastructure that
is somewhat more disjointed than that seen in Figure 18. The smoothness in the data
results partly from using the turnpike and canal data in Jackman (1962) which groups
counties geographically and partly from then mapping that data into the one-dimensional
interval representation.
Figure 18: Transport cost (average of 10 runs, normalized)
6.4 Counterfactual policies
As described in Section 2, the development of transport infrastructure during the indus-
trial revolution in England and Wales was largely driven by private and local finance. The
model of endogenous infrastructure development captures aspects of that history. Section
2 also noted the historical contrast with France during the period of the industrial revo-
lution. In addition to the historical contrast, modern infrastructure development involves
a great deal of State planning in eﬀorts to stimulate growth.
We can look at counterfactuals involving the timing and spatial distribution of infras-
tructural development. We construct a baseline based on an individual outturn of the
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model with endogenous infrastructure.9 Our first counterfactual concerns the timing of
the infrastructure development. We run the model with the infrastructure development
brought forward or pushed back 10 and 20 years in time to see the impact on the timing
of takeoﬀ.
Table 3: Baseline and Counterfactuals (averages of 10 runs)
t ℓ t to 1.5%
Baseline 55.4 322.7 83.5
1. Early infrastructure (20 years) 81.4 305.0 74.7
2. Early infrastructure (10 years) 79.4 305.0 82.5
3. Late infrastructure (10 years) 52.2 324.4 86.0
4. Late infrastructure (20 years) 50.4 324.6 86.0
5. Uniform infrastructure 62.9 315.7 83.4
As shown in Table 3 (counterfactuals 1 and 2), bringing infrastructure improvements
forward in time substantially delays takeoﬀ. As in the counterfactuals of Section 4, a
later takeoﬀ is a slightly faster one. Pushing infrastructure back in time (counterfactu-
als 3 and 4) brings takeoﬀ marginally forward. While counter-intuitive, the impact of
varying the timing of infrastructure makes sense in the context of an endogenous spa-
tial growth model where agglomeration and concentration matters for firm investment in
innovation. In particular, early investment in infrastructure reduces the costs of being
further from big markets and leads to agglomerations that are less spatially concentrated.
That means firms are less likely to be of the scale necessary to amortize the fixed costs of
investing in innovation. Moreover, because of the scale eﬀect in equation (9), when they
do innovate they do so with less intensity. Greater structural transformation is required,
through longer growth in agricultural productivity, before manufacturing firms are suﬃ-
ciently large to invest in innovation. The impact of delaying infrastructure is (marginally)
to do the opposite; higher transport costs encourage the concentration of industry and
firms attain scale more quickly. These counterfactuals suggest that eﬀorts to generate a
takeoﬀ in growth by investing in infrastructure may be misplaced. That is, infrastruc-
ture improvements respond to the emergence of industrial hotspots, rather than stimulate
them.
A second counterfactual takes the infrastructural development in the model and forces
all locations to share those improvements evenly. That is, for each period, the transport
cost in the model is averaged across all locations. We take this form of na¨ıve improvement
to reflect a State-managed plan like that in France during the period of the industrial rev-
olution. Table 3 (counterfactual 5) shows that the impact of a uniform infrastructure so
is to delay takeoﬀ by just over seven years relative to the baseline. While less damaging
9Imposing the average infrastructure development depicted in Figure 18 generates a reduction in
transport costs that is too fast and too broad relative to an individual infrastructure development.
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than bringing infrastructure forward in time, this small delay is consistent with the liter-
ature that argues that a centralized system of infrastructural development proved to be
a disadvantage during the industrial revolution.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of endogenous infrastructure development in the context of a
spatial growth framework and initialized it to England and Wales in c.1710. The model
can explain aspects of the evolution of the economy over the subsequent 171 years. In
particular, we capture the structural transformation across three sectors, the acceleration
in growth and the changing spatial distribution of activity in agriculture, industry and
transportation. We have seen how changes in the timing and spatial distribution of that
infrastructural development can have an eﬀect on the timing of the acceleration in growth
that accompanies industrialization.
We leave a number of extensions to be considered in future work. First, the Shaw-
Taylor et al. (2010a) data shows that there was specialization within industrial subsectors
as well as between agriculture and industry. A model of multiple secondary subsectors
that each specialize spatially may improve the fit of the model. Second, one aspect of
the private evolution of infrastructure during the industrial revolution in England and
Wales is that it grew in scale over time. A model that captures the expanding scale of
financing and organizing infrastructure may better explain the timing of the infrastructure
development seen in the data. Third, the model has focused on the costs of transporting
outputs. For the industrial revolution, the cost of transporting raw materials and energy
inputs such as coal were as important to industrial growth. Accounting for the eﬀect of
infrastructure on the costliness of trade in inputs may be important in understanding the
full impact of infrastructure on development.
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